

Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-25 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

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SAM-01 OIC-04 DRC-01 IO-14 /162 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/IR:TMCNAMARA:SBC

APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:RHMILLER

ACDA/IR:TJHIRSCHFELD

D:FCIKLE

ACDA/IR:CVANDOREN (SUBSTANCE)

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R 231604Z MAR 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T STATE 058831

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: VERIFICATION

REF: A. VIENNA 2263, B. USNATO 1383

SUMMARY

1. IN MARCH 19 DISCUSSION OF MBFR VERIFICATION BETWEEN FRG DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH AND ACDA DIRECTOR IKLE, (KEY POINTS IN NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS BELOW) ROTH REPEATED NOW WELL-KNOWN FRG DISTINCTION BETWEEN VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS, WHERE OVERT INSPECTORS COULD BE USED AND SUBSEQUENT VERIFICATION OF REMAINING FORCE LEVELS WHICH
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COULD INVOLVE NATIONAL MEANS COMBINED WITH VARIOUS SUP-

PLEMENTAL MEASURES. ROTH REITERATED THAT VERIFICATION SHOULD NOT BE RESTRICTED TO GERMANY, AND THAT FRG SHOULD NOT BE LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO ACCEPT NEW "MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS." ROTH THOUGHT IKLE'S SUGGESTIONS OF RESTRICTING VERIFICATION STUDY TO PHASE I WOULD BE HELPFUL. HE SAID THAT WE SHOULD ASK EAST FOR MORE THAN WE EXPECT TO RECEIVE. IKLE EMPHASIZED IMPORTANT ROLE OVERT VERIFICATION COULD PLAY IN AUTHENTICATING A SUSPECTED VIOLATION, THUS PERMITTING A QUICK ALLIED RESPONSE. END SUMMARY.

2. IN PHASE I ROTH EMPHASIZED FRG DOES NOT WANT VERIFICATION CONFINED TO GERMAN TERRITORY, AND DOES NOT WANT TO BE LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO ACCEPT NEW "MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS" (I.E., PERMANENT INSPECTION ON GERMAN SOIL).

3. DR. IKLE SAID OUR INTEREST IN NEGOTIATED VERIFICATION WAS IN PART BASED ON SPECIAL NEED FOR QUICKLY AGREED ALLIED RESPONSE IN CASE OF SUDDEN MASSIVE VIOLATION. THIS WOULD REQUIRE ABILITY TO ESTABLISH CLEARLY, WITHOUT REVEALING SENSITIVE SOURCES, THAT CHANGE IN BALANCE OF FORCES HAD TAKEN PLACE. NEGOTIATED VERIFICATION COULD PROVIDE AUTHENTICATION NOT PROVIDED BY NATIONAL MEANS ALONE.

4. ROTH OBSERVED THAT VERIFICATION PROBLEMS IN PHASES I AND II WERE DIFFERENT. HE DREW DISTINCTION BETWEEN INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND FROM OVERT INSPECTION. BY AUTUMN, HE SAID, GERMAN STUDY ON HOW BEST TO UTILIZE THE COMBINED RESULTS OF BOTH WOULD BE COMPLETE. DR. IKLE HOPED STUDY WOULD CONSIDER REQUIREMENT TO AUTHENTICATE VIOLATIONS.

5. ROTH NOTED THAT TOO RESPONSIVE A VERIFICATION SYSTEM COULD INSPIRE FALSE ALARMS. THE PROBLEM IS TO DECIDE WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE A SIGNIFICANT FORCE CHANGE (I.E., WHAT ARE CRITICAL POINTS, WHAT MAGNITUDE OF FORCE CHANGES SHOULD CONCERN US?, AND THEREFORE, WHAT LEVEL OF EFFECTIVENESS SHOULD WE STRIVE FOR IN A VERIFICATION SYSTEM). FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID, IF THERE IS AN 80 LIKELIHOOD THAT WE COULD DETECT AN IMPORTANT CHANGE,

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WITHIN A VERIFICATION SYSTEM, WOULD TRYING TO NEGOTIATE ONE WHICH WAS 90 EFFICIENT BE WORTH THE INCREMENTAL EFFORT AND POLITICAL COSTS?

6. ROTH ASSERTED US APPEARED WILLING TO RELY MAINLY ON NATIONAL MEANS UNTIL MID-1973. HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND SHIFT TO GREATER INTEREST IN OVERT INSPECTION. DID US WISH, ("AS DR. IKLE HAD ALLEGEDLY SUGGESTED TO VON

STADEN") TO USE CONTINUOUS PRESENCE OF INSPECTORATES AS A STABILIZING ELEMENT? IF SO, WOULD US LIKE TO EXPAND OVERT INSPECTION AREA BEYOND THE NGA OR DID US CONCERNS ABOUT RECIPROCITY OF INSPECTION RULE THIS OUT? WE SHOULD, HE SAID, FIRST DECIDE HOW MUCH AND WHAT KIND OF VERIFICATION WAS DESIRABLE; THEN DECIDE WHAT WE COULD ACCEPT. THINKING VERIFICATION THROUGH THIS WAY MAY REDUCE OUR VERIFICATION DEMANDS ON THE EAST. ROTH ALSO

WONDERED HOW US REGARDED "PERMANENT" (PHASE I RELATED) SOVIET OBSERVATION OF US FORCES IN EUROPE: (E.G., IF US REMOVED FORCES FROM EUROPE IN MID-EAST CRISIS, WOULD WE WANT SOVIETS TO OBSERVE THIS?)

7. DR. IKLE SAID ALLIES INSPECTORS ON EASTERN SOIL COULD HELP OFFSET INFORMATION ADVANTAGE SOVIETS HAVE IN OPEN WESTERN COUNTRIES; IT WOULD BE NET BENEFIT TO WEST TO HAVE SUCH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, IF INSPECTORATES PROVED NEGOTIABLE. HE ATTRIBUTED HEIGHTENED INTEREST IN NEGOTIATED VERIFICATION TO ADDITIONAL WORK WE HAD DONE ON SPECIAL NATURE OF MBFR VERIFICATION, WHICH WAS DIFFERENT FROM SALT CASE. IKLE AGAIN STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF BEING ABLE TO CONVINCE OTHERS SUFFICIENTLY TO GET PROMPT ACTION, I.E. AUTHENTICATION.

8. ROTH SAW TWO DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS IN VERIFYING VIOLATIONS: THEIR DETECTION, AND THE EVALUATION OF INFORMATION ON VIOLATION. EFFECTIVE EVALUATION COULD BEST BE CARRIED OUT IN CAPITALS, WHICH WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT RESULTS OF BOTH OVERT INSPECTION AND INFORMATION FROM INTELLIGENCE SOURCES. DECISIONS COULD NOT BE MADE SOLELY ON BASIS OF OVERT INSPECTION. FRG WAS CONSIDERING WHETHER MULTILATERAL BODY TO EXCHANGE DATA AND SECRET

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DEAL WITH COMPLAINTS AT LOWER LEVELS MIGHT BE PRACTICAL.

9. REGARDING PHASE I REQUIREMENTS, HE SAID: (A) INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL PHASE WAS EASY; (B) PROBLEM ON CONSTRAINTS, SUCH AS ON MOVEMENTS INTO THE AREA WOULD BE REDUCED IF AGREEMENT ALLOWED SMALLEST POSSIBLE NUMBER OF ENTRY AND EXIT POINTS. (HE ASKED US IF WE COULD INFORM HIM OF OUR THINKING ON NGA ENTRY AND EXIT POINTS); (C) SINCE POST REDUCTION MONITORING WOULD REQUIRE NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NTM, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW WHAT NTM CANNOT DO, SO ALLIES COULD CONSIDER HOW TO FILL GAP.

10. ROTH REPEATED THAT FRG WAS CONSIDERING TEMPORARY VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS, AND COMBINATION OF NATIONAL

MEANS PLUS SUPPLEMENTAL MEASURES FOR SUBSEQUENT VERIFICATION OF RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS.

11. WITH RESPECT TO LIMITED ENTRY POINTS, ROTH THOUGHT THESE MIGHT BE PERMANENT VERIFICATION TEAMS WHICH WOULD NORMALLY STAY AT FIXED POSITIONS, BUT COULD MOVE INTO OTHER AREAS TO VERIFY FROM TIME TO TIME (E.G., ONCE A MONTH) WHETHER OTHER ENTRY POINTS ARE BEING USED. (ROTH GAVE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS ADVANCING TENTATIVE,

PERHAPS PERSONAL, IDEA AT THIS POINT: COMPROMISE BETWEEN FIXED AND MOBILE POSTS WOULD BE AT FEW ENTRY POSTS. HE MAY ALSO HAVE HAD IN MIND THAT IN NEGOTIATING THESE ENTRY POSTS, THEY MIGHT BE SO ARRANGED THAT, ON WESTERN SIDE, SEVERAL OF THEM WOULD BE LOCATED WITHIN BENELUX TERRITORY).

12. DR. IKLE SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO RECOMMEND IN USG THAT WE AGREE TO DEFER SEPARATE QUESTION OF STAGE II VERIFICATION. ROTH REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL. IKLE CAUTIONED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT WE NOT CONVEY IMPRESSION WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN VERIFICATION. ROTH EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES TO ASK FOR MORE THAN WE MIGHT EXPECT, PROVIDED ALLIES HAVE COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THEY WANT.

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13. DR. IKLE AND AMB. ROTH AGREED TO STAY IN TOUCH ON VERIFICATION QUESTIONS INCLUDING PHASE II VERIFICATION PROBLEMS.

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